
On Monday, France’s cybersecurity agency ANSSI reported that “several French entities” experienced security breaches, attributing the attacks to a Russian hacker group known for their involvement in significant cyber incidents in previous years.
ANSSI revealed the detection of an “intrusion campaign” where hackers associated with the Russian military intelligence agency GRU infiltrated the French software company Centreon. The objective was to implant two types of malware into the networks of Centreon’s clients, resembling the “supply chain attack” seen in the recent SolarWinds compromise, which affected various U.S. government agencies and numerous other entities.
Centreon acknowledged the information in a statement, stating that it has noted the details. The company emphasized that, at this point, there is no conclusive evidence indicating that the identified vulnerability pertains to a commercial version supplied by Centreon during the relevant period.
Among its clients, Centreon includes notable names such as Airbus, Air France, Thales, ArcelorMittal, Électricité de France (EDF), telecoms firm Orange, and the French Ministry of Justice. The extent and specific organizations affected by the software hack remain unclear.
Developing story: Please stay tuned for further updates on this story.
Background and context
A supply chain attack works by going after the pipe rather than the water. Instead of breaking into one government office, the attackers compromise a software company whose product sits inside many offices. Every customer that installs the update or connects to the service inherits the problem. One entry point becomes many.
That is why a vendor like Centreon matters out of proportion to its own size. Its tools sit in the networks of large employers, so a weakness in its code is a weakness shared by its clients. The company has said there is no conclusive evidence that the flaw it identified relates to the commercial version it supplied at the time, and that distinction will matter to its customers.
For the organisations named as clients, the work now is checking logs, isolating systems and confirming what was touched. That work is slow because it has to be careful, and because the affected set is not yet fully clear.
For everyone else, the lesson is about trust in the software supply. Buyers rarely inspect the code they install. They rely on the vendor, and on the agency that raises the alarm. Watch for updates from the agency and the company on which versions and which customers were involved.







